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Abstract—Widespread growth in Android malwares stimulates security researchers to propose different methods for analyzing and
detecting malicious behaviors in applications. Nevertheless, current solutions are ill-suited to extract the fine-grained behavior of
Android applications accurately and efficiently. In this paper, we propose ServiceMonitor, a lightweight host-based detection system
that dynamically detects malicious applications directly on mobile devices. ServiceMonitor reconstructs the fine-grained behavior of
applications based on a novel systematic system service use analysis technique. Using proposed system service use perspective
enables us to build a statistical Markov chain model to represent what and how system services are used to access system resources.
Afterwards, we consider built Markov chain in the form of a feature vector and use it to classify the application behavior into either
malicious or benign using Random Forests classification algorithm. ServiceMonitor outperforms current host-based solutions with
evaluating it against 4034 malwares and 10024 benign applications and obtaining 96% of accuracy rate and negligible overhead and
performance penalty.
Index Terms—Operating System, Android, Malware, Behavior Detection
F
1 INTRODUCTION
ANDROID is the most popular smart phone OS currentlybeing used. Gartner [1] reported that 85% of smart
phone sale in the first quarter of 2016 were Android based
devices. Android has brought about many new applica-
tions, which have resulted in a complete different level
of experiences for the end user. However, it has created
concern as to the security and privacy of the information
(i.e. contacts, geographical locations, photos, and etc.) being
used/shared with the new applications. As a result, and due
to its popularity, Android OS has been a major target for
new malwares. In fact, it has been reported by AV-Test [2],
that over 99 percent of new malicious applications targeting
mobile devices are aimed at Android devices.
There have been many approaches [3]–[13] proposed
to combat the rise of malwares in android devices. These
techniques vary in their approaches to the problem; the
techniques that operate outside the device, such as the
Google bouncer [3], to the applications that operate on
the end-user device [4], [5], [11] and provide a malware
detection service. It is important to note that these different
approaches are complement of each other and it is a good
example of defense in depth. This could be explained by the
fact that end-user detection is bound by limited resources
available on the device, but more importantly, market based
techniques are handicapped by the fact that not all appli-
cations are downloaded from a single market. In fact, there
are multiple alternative markets to the Google play, such
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as Amazon app store, SlideME, Samsung Galaxy Apps, etc.
This highlights the importance of employing the end-user
device malware detection techniques.
Techniques proposed for end-user devices are limited by
the resources on the devices as well as the user’s patience
(due to the overhead of the detection mechanism). Gener-
ally, these techniques operate by collecting the behaviors
(as a set of features) of the application being analyzed and
then decide on the nature of the application (i.e. benign or
malicious). The analysis could be done either statically or
dynamically.
Static techniques analyze the application’s bytecode with
near-complete coverage, considering all execution paths,
even if a part of the program never executes. Nevertheless,
these techniques are vulnerable to transformation attacks
[14] and could be evaded by obfuscation techniques such
as Java reflection and bytecode encryption. Furthermore,
malicious behaviors may be implemented in native codes
[15], which are not analyzed, or hidden and triggered in
run-time through additional codes loaded dynamically from
external sources [16].
Alternatively, dynamic analysis techniques observe the
behavior of applications at run time. But as Zhang et al.
[17] reported, most of these techniques which operate on
the end-user devices, consider the behavior of applications
at the system call level (i.e. the system calls executed and
the order of their execution). In fact, given the Android OS
architecture, such techniques obtain an incomplete view of
the behavior of the binary being analyzed. This becomes
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clear, when one considers that in the Android OS, appli-
cations are not able to directly access system resources (e.g.
SMS, camera, microphone, etc.) through system calls. In fact,
since applications are encapsulated in their own memory
space in Android, an IPC (Binder) mechanism is provided
through which applications can access system services by a
specific system call named ioctl. Hence, traditional dynamic
methods, which are based on analyzing system calls, are
less effective in malware detection, as they reconstruct the
behaviors of the applications based on a number of inter-
cepted system calls (e.g. ioctl), which contain no information
about the system services being accessed.
Considering the above noted observations and taking
into account the issues and limitations of static analysis
techniques, we propose a novel System Service Use Analysis
technique to capture and analyze the fine-grained behavior
(i.e. at the system services level) of applications with the aim
of detecting malicious applications. We build a statistical
model to represent what and how system services are used
to access system resources. Specifically, we model sequences
of requested functions from system services as Markov
chains, and use them to extract features and perform clas-
sification. To the best of our knowledge, ServiceMonitor is
the first method that systematically analyzes and models
system service use at multiple levels of semantics regardless
of whether it is from Java or native code, and classifies
Android applications as malicious or benign directly on
mobile devices. In summary, this paper makes the following
contributions:
• System service use analysis. We propose a systematic
system service use analysis technique, which auto-
matically and seamlessly models the state transitions
achieved by the functions requested from system
services as a Markov chain; aim at representing the
application behavior by its pattern of accesses to
system resources.
• Effective Android malware detection. We developed
a dynamic Android malware detection framework,
named ServiceMonitor, to reconstruct the behavior
of applications based on system service use analysis
technique with the aim of identifying malicious be-
haviors as well as malwares. ServiceMonitor is capa-
ble to detect Android malwares with high accuracy
and few false positives.
• Lightweight detection procedure. With taking into ac-
count the limitation of resources in mobile devices,
ServiceMonitor can efficiently apply system service
use analysis directly on mobile devices and detect
malicious applications in reasonable time.
In the remainder of this paper, we first survey a number
of related work in Section 2. Then the proposed system ser-
vice use analysis technique and ServiceMonitor’s detection
method are described in Section 3. After that we present the
implementation details and evaluation results in Section 4.
We also discuss some related issues on Android malware
detection and the limitations of ServiceMonitor in Section 5
and conclude the paper in Section 6.
2 RELATED WORK
There have been many techniques suggested in the lit-
erature for analyzing and detecting Android malwares.
These techniques could be categorized based on how the
analysis/detection agent is deployed as: i) Emulator-based
techniques, ii) Cloud-based techniques, which collect in-
formation from end-user device and then aggregate and
analyze the information on the cloud, and iii) Host-based
techniques, which are deployed wholly on the mobile de-
vice.
2.1 Emulator-based Analysis and Detection
Google bouncer [3] is one of the most well-known systems,
which automatically analyzes applications on Android of-
ficial market and purges malicious apps. Although there
is little public documentation available, based on a set of
experiments presented in [18], Google bouncer is a dy-
namic analysis system that runs and monitors applications
in a QEMU [19] based emulator which can be easily de-
tected and evaded. AppsPlayground [20], Andrubis [21],
and DroidBox [22] are alternate analyzers, which are based
on the QEMU emulator and extend a popular taint tracking
framework named TaintDroid [23] to track sensitive infor-
mation with the goal of malware analysis. However, due to
the dynamic taint analysis, such approaches are vulnerable
to evasion attacks presented in [24]–[26].
Other efforts, such as DroidScope [27] and CopperDroid
[28], [29] are dynamic analysis platforms that leverage vir-
tual machine introspection [30] to extract the behaviors of
applications considering OS and Android-specific views.
Dash et al. [31] proposed DroidScribe as a dynamic multi-
classification system built upon CopperDroid. DroidScribe
classifies malicious applications in known malware families
based on extracted behaviors from CopperDroid sandbox.
The reader is referred to [32], for a good comparison of
dynamic analysis techniques in controlled environment.
All of the mentioned systems are based on software vir-
tualization and emulation techniques. So, they suffer from
several fundamental limitations (i.e. performance penalties,
transparency issues, and special software requirements) for
deploying on end-user devices. Furthermore, all of them
are vulnerable to evasion attacks [33]–[36] by which the
presence of virtual machine could be detected by malicious
applications.
2.2 Cloud-based Analysis and Detection
Another approach proposed by a number of researchers is to
have data collected on the end-user device, but offloading
the analysis to the cloud in order to obtain an aggregate
view of the applications being executed on different de-
vices, and minimize the cost of analysis on each device.
For example, Crowdroid [4] is a dynamic analysis based
approach that collects system call logs employing strace
tool, and transmits the logs in addition to the information
about each device as well as the installed application list
to a dedicated server. The collected information is then
processed to obtain a set of identifying features with which
the malicious applications are detected.
Recently, Sun et al. [12] proposed Monet, an Android
malware detection system, that is based on constructing
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dependency graphs to model the dependencies between
application components and system services. But the ana-
lyzing and detection procedure of Monet requires a backend
server for graph mining and similarity computation. Alter-
natively, ParanoidAndroid [37] deploys a virtual clone of
the given mobile device on a remote server synchronized
with activities on the real mobile device. Hence, researchers
could perform detection techniques on the collected traces
without disrupting end users. However, the effectiveness
of crowdsourcing frameworks relies on the reaction of end
users when they are asked to send recorded logs from
applications to an external server.
2.3 Host-based Analysis and Detection
As an alternate approach, a number of techniques are pro-
posed which are executable on the end-user device given
the performance constraints, without requiring emulators
or cloud based analyzers.
Kirin [38] is one of the first methods that statically de-
tects malicious Android applications considering requested
permissions that break conservative security specifications.
A number of proposals look at the APIs called by each appli-
cation, in order to decide on the intent of the application (i.e.
malicious or benign). For example, DroidAPIMiner [6] cap-
tures the names and parameters of sensitive APIs as features
for classifying Android applications. DroidMiner [9] consid-
ers the relations between multiple sensitive APIs and not
only their frequency or names. Along similar lines, Zhang
et al. [7] proposed DroidSift, a semantic-based approach that
leverages a weighted contextual API dependency graphs to
classify Android applications. Unlike other static solutions,
DroidSift and DroidMiner are resistant against minor trans-
formation attacks [14]; because they extract features based
on application’s behavior (i.e. dependency of API calls).
Furthermore, there have been a number of static learning
based studies in which the features are defined and se-
lected based on some malicious code patterns and heuristics.
DroidMat [8] and Drebin [5] are two similar approaches that
extract detection features from applications disassembled
codes and manifest the files as much as possible. These two
approaches hold the occurrence of sensitive API calls in their
feature sets beside other information like requested per-
missions and names of application components (i.e. activ-
ities, services, broadcast receivers, and content providers).
These approaches also differ from each other in how to
structure features extracted from the applications. ICCDe-
tector [10] is a static based method that extracts ICC (Inter-
Component Communication)-related features that hold in-
teractions within or cross applications’ components, and
then leverage machine learning techniques to perform clas-
sification. Actually, the ICC-related features represent the
pattern of communications between applications’ compo-
nents, which are done through messages named Intents
(i.e. communications in Java abstraction layer). As noted
briefly in introduction and stated in [14], static analysis and
detection techniques are thought to be insufficient to detect
malware variants generated by transformation and obfus-
cation attacks. Also, most of the current static solutions are
ill-suited to analyze additional codes loaded dynamically
from external sources [16] as well as native codes [15].
On the other hand, there have been a number of pro-
posed works in which applications are analyzed dynami-
cally to detect malwares at runtime. MADAM [11] [39] is
a hybrid system that defines several syscall based features
beside some user activity based features related to user
idleness and sent SMS messages to spot malicious activity
on the mobile device directly. However, as Zhang et al
mentioned in [17], all syscall based systems share one fun-
damental limitation. Due to the missing high-level Android-
specific semantics, their analysis is ineffective to demon-
strate the fine-grained and accurate behaviors of Android
applications. To solve this limitation, Sun et al. [13] pro-
posed Patronus, which focuses on fine-grained behaviors of
applications. Patronus is a host based intrusion prevention
system for Android devices. Patronus considers a database
of manually crafted malicious policies from known mal-
ware samples and calculates the similarity score between
transaction footprint extracted from running applications
on user’s device and malicious transactions (recorded in
policy database) aim at preventing malicious intrusions
and detecting malwares at run-time. But Patronus depends
on experts to define security policies and rules to cover
malware misbehaviors. Hence, due to the known malicious
policies in its database, it could not be effective and suited
for detecting unknown and zero-day malware families.
In what follows, and based on the noted limitations
of the previous related works, we propose an effective
dynamic detection method for malware detection on end-
user devices.
3 OUR APPROACH
In the Android security architecture, each application is
isolated in a separate sandbox, and direct access from ap-
plications to the system resources (i.e. SMS, GPS, address
book, etc.) is prohibited. Instead, access to system resources
is handled through the binder driver component, which
verifies that the given application has the proper permission
to access the specific system resources. On the other hand,
applications require access to different system resources to
operate properly. Where such operations could be benign as
advertised by the application creator, or malicious; although
appears to be benign by the client. In both scenarios system
resources are accessed, but the type of resources and the
order of accesses are different.
The malicious behaviors that are frequently observed
from Android malwares have been widely surveyed in the
research literature [6], [40]–[43] and malware reports [44].
Based on those studies and the analysis that we have done
on both benign and malicious samples, we believe that a
fine-grained behavioral model could be constructed through
observing accesses to a dozen of system services and their
functions implemented in the framework layer of Android
operating system. Furthermore, and based on the Android
system documentation [45], system services could be cate-
gorized into six broad categories. These categories and the
services that they cover are shown in Table 1.
In what follows, we discuss the details of the detection
process in which “ServiceMonitor” receives the execution
traces (i.e. functions requested from system services) of an
application and then models the behavior of the application
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ServiceMonitor Service
A
B
C
D
G
E
F
Dalvik VM
Location 
Manager 
Service
Package 
Manager 
Service
Activity 
Manager 
Service
Binder Kernel 
Driver
System Services
  
Java Libraries 
Hardware Libraries
Java Component
Java Libraries 
Dalvik VM
Native Component
Binder Library
Native Libraries 
APP_1
APP_2
Binder Library
Native Libraries 
System Server
ServiceMonitor Kernel Module
Un-marshalling Hooking
System Resources
(Other Device Drivers)
IOCTL Syscall
User Space
Kernel Space
Markov Chain Graph
Feature Vector
Classification
Log
Fig. 1. Architecture and detection process of ServiceMonitor.
as a Markov chain. Finally, a feature vector is generated
from the Markov chain model and fed to a binary classifier
to determine the nature of the given application as either
malicious or benign. Fig. 1 represents the mentioned process
beside the architecture of the proposed monitoring system.
3.1 Monitoring of Applications’ Service Requests
As noted earlier, in the Android security model, all trans-
actions to/from each application (including those appears
between the application and other applications or between
the application and system services) would be only possible
through the Binder library.
The Binder library itself is divided into two segments:
i) a user-space shared library called libbinder.so and
ii) a kernel-level driver.
libbinder.so is tasked with receiving requests from the user-
space process and marshalling them into a Parcel object
which is then passed to the kernel-level binder driver for
further processing, given the permission granted to the ap-
plication. More specifically, the ioctl system call is employed
by applications to make requests to the Binder library.
In order to obtain detailed information about the system
services requested by each application, we implemented
a kernel module with which ioctl system calls are inter-
cepted and unmarshaled (i.e. parsed). More details on the
implementation are provided in Section 4. The architecture
and overall design of ServiceMonitor is depicted in Fig. 1.
ServiceMonitor’s kernel module is split into hooking and
unmarshaling components for obtaining ioctl system calls
and unmarshaling them respectively. We should note that
the unmarshaling procedure, which is introduced in the
following, is based on the previous works [28], [46], [47] that
present the structure of ioctl system calls and architecture of
Binder transactions.
The ioctl system call has the following syntax:
ioctl(Driver fd, BINDER WRITE READ, &bwr);
Since we aim at intercepting Binder transactions,
/dev/binder is the only considerable value for us that deter-
mines the file descriptor of Binder devices as the first ioctl
argument.
BINDER WRITE READ command is the basis for all IPC
operations. Thus, we consider that as the request code that
should exist in the intercepted ioctl system calls.
The last and the most important argument of ioctl system
call is a pointer to a struct of the type bwr (short for
binder write read). As illustrated in Fig. 2, this data structure
contains a pointer to a valuable buffer named write buffer,
which holds the type of transactions and the respected
parameters. Due to the fact that we would like to intercept
Binder transactions, BC TRANSACTION is the only one of
these transaction types that is of interest to our work. At
the next level and in the Binder transactions, we are dealing
with a data structure named binder transaction data. As de-
picted in Fig. 2, this data structure contains some valuable
attributes that could be used for extracting system services
and corresponding functions that are requested through the
invocation of this ioctl system call. The code attribute is the
code of the requested function, which is implemented in the
destination system service and is required to be executed by
the source application. buffer-ptr is a pointer to the Parcel
object that we would like to unmarshal. There is a 16-bit
Unicode string named InterfaceToken at the start of every
Parcel object structure. InterfaceToken determines the name
of the system service that is considered as the server for the
SUBMITTED TO THE IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 5
TABLE 1
System services could be categorized into 6 categories. The information noted in this table was obtained from documentations available at
developer.android.com
Service Category Interfaces Functionalities
Telephony Manager ISms
IPhoneSubInfo
ITelephony
ITelephonyRegistry
Sends text messages, retrieves phone numbers, retrieves the unique device ID (e.g., IMEI),
retrieves the serial number of the ICC, retrieves the unique subscriber ID (e.g., IMSI), re-
trieves the software version number of the device (e.g., IMEI/SV), retrieves the network type
for data transmission, retrieves the current active phone type (e.g., PHONE TYPE CDMA,
PHONE TYPE GSM), listens to the phone state changes
Location Manager ILocationManager Retrieves the last known location, registers for location updates, retrieves the list of the names
of LocationProviders that satisfy the given criteria, retrieves the name of the provider that has
the most compliance with the given criteria
Network Manager IConnectivityManager
IWifiManager
Retrieves the current proxy settings, retrieves the connection status information of a particular
network type, retrieves the details of the current active default data network, retrieves the
connection status information of all network types supported by the device, retrieves the
dynamic information about the current Wi-Fi connection, retrieves the Wi-Fi enabled status
Activity Manager IActivityManager Starts a service, Stops a service, Resumes an activity, Idles an activity, Gets the list of running
application processes, Checks permissions, Retrieves the memory information, Registers for
Intent broadcasts (e.g., Boot Completed), Broadcasts Intents, Gets a content provider, Removes
a content provider, Starts an activity, Pauses an activity, Finishes an activity, Gets services,
Unregisters Intent receivers, Gets the orientation, Sets the orientation, Kills a list of processes,
Gets task id of an activity, Gets the sender of a given Intent
Package Manager IPackageManager Retrieves the list of all packages installed, retrieves information about a particular pack-
age/application, retrieves the names of all packages that are associated with a particular user id,
retrieves information about an application package installed on the system, retrieves information
about a particular activity class, retrieves all activities can be performed for the given intent,
checks whether a particular package has been granted a particular permission, checks for the
presence of the given feature name in OS
OS Related Activi-
ties
IPowerManager
IServiceManager
IMountService
Retrieves the overall interactive state of the device (i.e. actual state of the screen), acquires the
wake lock and forces the device to stay on, releases the wake lock, retrieves an existing service
with the given name, retrieves the state of a volume via its mount point, retrieves the list of all
mountable volumes
ioctl(Driver_fd, BINDER_WRITE_READ, &bwr)
write_size
write_consumed
write_buffer
...
BC_TR Params
BC_... Params
code
data_size
buffer_ptr
...
InterfaceToken Params
com.android.internal.telephony.ISms (...) : sendText
Fig. 2. Dissecting ioctl syscall. ServiceMonitor extracts the target sys-
tem service (e.g. com.android.internal.telephony.ISms) and requested
function (e.g. sendText) by dissecting ioctl system calls.
application request.
Finally, the requested functions and system services are
recorded in a chronological order as behavioral features
and delivered to ServiceMonitor’s service for modeling and
classification. Owing to the fact that these characteristics
of Android OS have stabled during all version releases of
Android, our IPC dissecting procedure is a portable way
to reconstruct application behaviors, independent from the
internal complexity of applications.
3.2 Markov-chain Modeling of Application Behaviors
ServiceMonitor employs Markov chains for modeling ap-
plication behaviors. A Markov chain could be described by
a weighted directed graph. Actually, in this representation
there is a set of nodes that belong to different states, and a
set of edges between them weighted with the probability of
transition from each node to another one.
In our proposal, for each application, the potential de-
pendencies between the states obtained by calling functions
of system services are represented as a Markov chain. In
fact, ServiceMonitor generates a complete weighted directed
graph in which each vertex of ϕ corresponds to a state ob-
tained by calling a function of a system service (using ioctl
system call). For each function Fx of system services, we
take an abstract state (denoted by State(Fx)) representing
the application state after calling the function. In this way,
the generated graph has |ϕ|2 edges and each edge has a
weight; representing the probability of the corresponding
state transition.
In this modeling scheme, the weights of edges are ob-
tained by analyzing the sequences (traces) of requested
functions from system services; which are logged by the
monitoring system. The distance between two requested
functions Fi and Fj in a sequence σ (where i and j are
the indexes of them in the sequence) is defined as follows:
d(Fi, Fj) = j − i
Actually, the distance value d(Fi, Fj) can determine the
potential relationship (i.e. data or control flow) between a
pair of requested functions Fi and Fj in a sequence σ. In
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other words, two requested functions that are closer to each
other have more contribution on the weight of the edge
between their corresponding states in the Markov chain
graph.
Now, we define Pxy as the probability of transition from
state sx to sy (the weight of the directed edge (sx, sy)) as the
following, where State(Fz) determines the abstract state of
the application after receiving the requested service function
Fz .
FVxy =

0 , if x = y
∑
i<j≤|σ|,
sx=State(Fi),sy=State(Fj),
6∃h,(i<h<j ∧ sx=State(Fh)
1
d(Fi, Fj)
, otherwise
Pxy = FVxy/
∑
1≤l≤|σ|
FVxl
Note that in this paper, for the sake of simplicity, we
label the state of an application after receiving a requested
service, by the name of the requested function from system
services (e.g., see Fig. 3; which is the Markov chain model
of the example represented in the next section).
The pseudo-code of building the Markov chain graph is
represented in Procedure 1.
Procedure 1 Building the Markov chain graph
Input: system service trace, system service list
Output: probability matrix
1: size=len(system service list)
2: Declare Integer FV[size][size]
3: j=len(system service trace)
4: for i = 0→ j − 1 do
5: line=system service trace[i]
6: index=system service list.index(line)
7: append index to map list
8: end for
9: k=len(map list)
10: for i = 0→ k − 1 do
11: for j = i+ 1→ k − 1 do
12: if map list[i] 6= map list[j] then
13: FV[map list[i]][map list[j]]+=(1/(j-i))
14: else
15: Break
16: end if
17: end for
18: end for
19: for i = 0→ size− 1 do
20: S=SUM(FV[i][:])
21: for j = 0→ size− 1 do
22: FV[i][j]=FV[i][j]/S
23: end for
24: end for
25: Return FV
3.3 Feature Extraction and Classification
The final step for determining the nature of an application is
extracting a feature vector and feeding the vector into a ma-
chine learning algorithm for classification of the application
1
0.64
0
0
10.36
ISms : sendText
ILocationManager : 
requestLocationUpd
ates
IPhoneSubInfo : 
getSubscriberId
Fig. 3. Markov chain model of an application’s behavior.
behavior. To this aim, we take the weights of |ϕ|2 edges
of the Markov chain graph (generated from the logged
sequences of requested functions from system services) as
a 1D feature vector fv = [f1, f2, ..., f|ϕ|2 ], where fi is equal
to Pkm so that i = (k − 1) · |ϕ|+m.
Then we employ Random Forests algorithm for classify-
ing the application behavior to either malicious or benign
using the extracted feature vector. To train the classification
algorithm, we can use the samples of known malwares
and benign applications. Section 4 describes the training,
evaluation, and feature reduction process in more details.
Example: Consider an application that requests the fol-
lowing functions respectively: getSubscribedID, requestLoca-
tionUpdates, sendText, requestLocationUpdates, sendText. Fol-
lowing the proposed approach, we monitor and extract
these functions requested from system services by our
proposed IPC dissecting procedure and model them in
a Markov chain graph like Fig. 3. Then, we extract the
specified feature vector as [0, 0.64, 0.36, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0] from
the Markov chain model of application behavior for classifi-
cation purpose. Note that in this example we supposed that
we have only three functions in Android architecture.
4 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We implemented our proposed method in a system called
ServiceMonitor. The main module is a kernel module,
which is implemented in C and is tasked to monitor each
application and log the functions requested from system
services by each application in their chronological order.
More specifically, the developed kernel module intercepts
the ioctl system calls and dissects them to extract the func-
tions requested from the system services. This is done by
rewriting the address of the ioctl function implementation
in system call table.
system call table is implemented in kernel level and is
used for organizing system functions and quick access to
them. Hence, at first, we need to obtain the address of
system call table from the vector swi handler. Indeed, by
using the technique proposed in [48], we are able to obtain
the address of system call table in all versions of Android
OS in a similar fashion. After that, we rewrite the address
of the ioctl function and redirect all Binder transactions to
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our unmarshaling component. Finally, after logging and dis-
secting Binder transactions, we redirect them to the original
ioctl function for continuing the normal execution of the
application.
The collected features are then processed using a second
module, implemented in Python, with which the requested
system services are transformed into the Markov chain
representation discussed earlier.
Lastly, an implementation of the classification algorithm,
based on the randomForest library [49] written in R lan-
guage [50], is used to generate a model for distinguish-
ing the malicious applications from the benign ones. The
introduced modules are collected in a standalone appli-
cation, which could be deployed on an end device with
the aim of employing a detection model, which is trained
offline, and classifying running applications as either ma-
licious or benign. The source code of the above described
modules is available at http://ce.sharif.edu/∼masalehi/
ServiceMonitor.
In what follows, we first describe the dataset used in
evaluating the proposed framework in Section 4.1. The
details on how the features are extracted from the collected
dataset are presented in Section 4.2. Finally, the proposed
approach is evaluated in Section 4.3.
4.1 Dataset
In order to evaluate the accuracy and performance of Ser-
viceMonitor, we built a dataset of applications including
benign and malicious samples. Our dataset of malicious
applications was composed of 5560 samples, from 179 dif-
ferent families, obtained from the Drebin dataset [5], which
extends the Android Malware Genome Project dataset [42].
The distribution of samples in each malicious family is
illustrated in Fig. 4. Note that the Drebin dataset was built
for a static analysis approach. Therefore, a number of issues
arise when employing dynamic analysis approaches on the
samples provided in this dataset. First, a number of samples
in Drebin dataset could not be installed on an Android
device. More specifically, we found that 429 samples have
broken APK files. Second, we were unable to execute 1097
samples for analysis, either due to the fact that the applica-
tion was dependent on the presence of another application,
or the application executed as a background service. Consid-
ering the noted issues with our initial dataset, we excluded
such applications from the dataset, hence our malicious set
contained a total of 4034 samples.
Furthermore, we crawled the official Android store to
collect 10370 samples from May 2016 to June 2016. In order
to make sure that these samples were benign in nature, we
submitted them to VirusTotal [51], which tests applications
by fifty-four anti-malware engines. We found and elimi-
nated 346 suspicious samples, therefore our benign dataset
consisted of 10024 total number of samples.
4.2 Feature Collection
In order to collect the described feature vectors from the
described dataset, applications were installed on an un-
modified Android version 4.4.4 (KitKat version), which was
deployed upon a specific virtual machine called VirtualBox
[52] for executing and tracing them simultaneously. As
Others
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Fig. 4. Distribution of samples in each malicious family in our initiated
dataset.
mentioned earlier in this paper, the tracing of applications’
behaviors with the aim of extracting the features are done
through the ServiceMonitor’s kernel module.
In order to process the large number of applications
in the dataset, we automated the process of installation,
execution, interaction, and data collection. This was done by
installing each application in a clean state of the operating
system automatically by using adb tool and simulating end
users’ activities and interactions. We leveraged MonkeyRun-
ner tool [53] in a script written in Python to simulate the
interaction (e.g. screen clicks and touches) of end users with
the system and application. By this script we were sending
random events to the application with 2 milliseconds pause
period between the successive events. Finally, after the exe-
cution of all events in the virtual machine, we stopped the
execution of application and revert the machine to the clean
state by replacing it with the clean snapshot of the virtual
machine that was taken before installing the application.
Taking a snapshot and reverting to it afterwards are func-
tionalities of VirtualBox and we used them by implementing
a bash script.
4.3 Experimental Evaluation
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of ServiceMonitor,
we employed the Random Forests [49] classification algo-
rithm. For this experiment, we trained the classifier with
the feature vectors obtained from Markov chain modeling
procedure and also we used a k-fold cross-validation pro-
cedure with k=10 to overcome the over fitting problem.
Furthermore, we should note that we extracted 51077 fea-
tures for each application in the dataset. So, due to the
machine learning problems with high dimensional data, it
was difficult to have an efficient and accurate estimator
in this case. As a remedy, in this step we used a well-
suited feature selection method called Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) [54]. In this statistical procedure, PCA ranks
features by considering their variance in the feature space.
In other words, we apply PCA to identify uncorrelated
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Fig. 5. ROC curve obtained by evaluating the trained model, against the
test dataset. The area under the ROC curve is 0.97.
and most important features to reduce the dimension of
feature space and improve the efficiency and accuracy of
the detection system as well. After application of PCA, we
reduced the dimension to 200 components/features with
the highest contribution to the classification decision (i.e.
features with maximum variance). Finally, we used the
reduced-dimension feature vectors for learning the classifier
and building the detection model.
The result of this experiment was encouraging. Ser-
viceMonitor effectively classified the malicious and benign
applications in the introduced dataset with accuracy rate
of 96%, false-negative rate of 2.1%, and false-positive rate
of 4.4%. Fig. 5 depicts the ROC curve of this experiment
to illustrate the true-positive rate against different false-
positive values. The calculated area under the ROC curve
(i.e. AUC) is 0.97.
4.3.1 Runtime Measurement
With the aim of measuring the overhead of ServiceMon-
itor, we used the PassMark PerformanceTest v2.0 [55] to
benchmark the CPU and memory. In fact, PassMark con-
ducts eight different tests to determine a device’s PassMark
rating for CPU and memory. Since the benchmark results of
PassMark test are returned as indexes, the higher value in
this test means better performance. As illustrated in Table
2, the overhead of ServiceMonitor on CPU and memory
is acceptable. Actually, there is 0.8% and 2% performance
impact on CPU and memory respectively. As shown, the
highest overhead is on memory and this is mainly due to
the IPC dissecting procedure that incurs overhead on Binder
transactions.
4.3.2 Comparison with Related work
Among the many proposals in the literature, we considered
Patronus [13] as the state of the art host-based approach,
with which we could compare the proposed ServiceMonitor.
However, as the Patronus implemented system was not
TABLE 2
Run time overhead of ServiceMonitor, measured by
passmark benchmark.
Test Baseline ServiceMonitor Overhead
CPU 13520 13410 0.8%
Memory 13860 13550 2%
Higher rating value means better performance.
available, we were not able to evaluate Patronus based
on the dataset employed in our evaluations. Hence and in
order to conduct a valid comparison, we employed a dataset
with similar malicious families (i.e. BaseBridge, FakeAV, and
MobileTx) as used in Patronus, to evaluate ServiceMonitor.
With the similar dataset, ServiceMonitor obtains an ac-
curacy rate of 97.5% roughly 10% higher than Patronus;
Furthermore, ServiceMonitor has false-positive rate of 0%
against the Patronus’s dataset, which is 1% lower than
Patronus’s FPR. More importantly, Patronus is a policy-
based solution, which is built on manually crafted malicious
policies. Hence in contrast to ServiceMonitor, Patronus is
not able to detect unknown malicious behaviors and zero-
day malwares. Also we should note that the overhead of
ServiceMonitor is smaller than Patronus in the evaluated
benchmark tests. Specifically, Patronus has 0.9% and 8%
overhead on CPU and memory respectively in comparison
with ServiceMonitor that has 0.8% and 2% overhead on CPU
and memory respectively.
5 DISCUSSION
In what follows, we discuss a number of observations made
with respect to the different functionalities requested by the
benign and malicious applications existing in the evaluation
dataset. Furthermore, we discuss the limitations of the pro-
posed service monitor technique for malware detection in
Android.
5.1 Observations
Given the large dataset employed in the evaluation of the
proposed technique, we were able to obtain further insight
into how applications, either benign or malicious, request
access to different functionalities.
1) Telephony Manager: As expected, requesting functions
from telephony system services, like functions related to
retrieve phone number and unique device ID (i.e. IMEI), oc-
curs more commonly in malware applications. More specif-
ically, more than 67% of the malware applications retrieve
phone-related subscriber information, while there are only
9% of the benign applications with similar functionali-
ties. Actually, telephony related methods like getDeviceId(),
getLine1Number(), getSubscriberId(), getIccSerialNumber() are
widely used in malicious applications in comparison with
benign ones.
In addition, a great number of current malicious Android
applications (like malware samples belong to OpFake and
Gemini families) subscribe to premium-rate services and
send SMS messages to them with profitability objectives.
Based on the results, while 17% of the malicious applications
have telephony activities which cause financial charges to
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the infected users, it was done by none of benign applica-
tions in our dataset.
2) Location Manager: Some malicious applications have
access to GPS modules with the goal of collecting location
data. For example, a malware family named AccuTrack is a
family of applications that track down the GPS location of
the device and turns it into a GPS tracker. In practice during
the test, 12% of the malware applications gained access to
the location data, while only 7% of the benign applications
requested these services.
3) Package Manager: In our experiments, it is common
that malwares (like some samples in DroidDream malware
family) invoke getInstalledPackages() method to retrieve a list
of all packages that are installed on the device to take an
appropriate action. The result shows that about 16% of the
malicious applications requested such data during their test
time while only 1% of the benign applications requested it.
4) Activity Manager: getRunningAppProcesses() method
from the ActivityManager class was invoked in 3.7% of the
malicious applications to retrieve the list of running applica-
tion processes; however, only 1% of the benign applications
invoked this method. Applications can use this capability to
check the presence of a running specific service (e.g., Anti-
malware) in the device to take an action (like killing the anti-
malware process). getMemoryInfo() is another method used
frequently by 5.7% of the malicious applications to retrieve
available memory space on the device, whereas only 0.7%
of the benign applications requested this method.
5) Service Manager: As a whole, the results show that
requesting system services in the malware applications has
more frequency than the benign applications, such that on
average each malware requested 38 system services during
its test time whereas less than 12 service requests occurred
in each benign application. Actually, we considered the
occurrences of getService() method, from the ServiceManager
class, in Android applications to determine the average of
service requests in them.
5.2 Limitations
Even though ServiceMonitor is able to detect Android mal-
wares accurately, we should note a number of issues which
could limit its accuracy. As noted in [35], detecting the
virtualization or emulation environments is one of the most
popular methods employed by Android malware families
(e.g. Android.HeHe [56] and OBAD [57]) to evade analysis
procedure and alter their behaviors accordingly. Therefore,
due to the execution environment of ServiceMonitor’s train-
ing phase, which is based on a specific virtual machine,
some malwares could fingerprint the virtualized environ-
ment and avoid requests to the system services and hence be
classified as benign in our experiments. Furthermore, some
malicious samples were unable to show their malicious
behavior, because for example the C&C servers of some
malwares were not available during the analysis time or
the malicious logic maybe hidden and only executed, or
triggered, under specific circumstances.
As a learning-based method, ServiceMonitor might also
be vulnerable to pollution and mimicry attacks [58]. In
other words, malicious applications could randomly request
system services and functionalities to change the original
pattern of their requested functions from system services
aim at confusing the detection system.
And finally, since loading the kernel module of Ser-
viceMonitor requires root access, our detection system only
runs on rooted devices. But the encouraging results of the
ServiceMonitor for detecting malicious applications and its
reasonable performance on mobile devices with limited re-
sources, rendering it suitable for manufacturers to integrate
ServiceMonitor directly on the operating systems of mobile
devices.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a system service use analy-
sis technique that systematically extracts fine-grained be-
haviors of applications based on their accesses to system
resources. Furthermore, we designed and implemented a
host based system, called ServiceMonitor, that dynamically
tracks execution behaviors of applications based on the
proposed system service use analysis technique and models
these behaviors in the form of Markov chains to classify
applications into benign or malicious.
Our evaluation results show that ServiceMonitor is able
to detect Android malwares accurately and efficiently on
mobile devices. Employing the Random Forests classifier
against 4034 malwares and 10024 benign applications, Ser-
viceMonitor were able to obtain the accuracy rate of 96% in
distinguishing malicious applications from the benign ones.
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